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Abstract  
Relying on Pigou's view, environmental taxes increase the costs of polluting activities 
reflecting in this way the true social cost imposed to society by the caused 
environmental damage by these activities. The total pollution cost (TPC) is defined by 
adding up the marginal abatement (MAC) and the marginal damage (MD) costs. That 
is the random variable TPC includes the social costs associated with pollution. We 
relate this with contaminated locations and propose a weighted location differentiated 
tax and a corresponding index that adjusts taxation to the damages caused. It is clear 
that the value of the expected total pollution (social) cost, E(TPC), would be of 
interest and therefore we proceed to the evaluation through the use of the γ-order 
Generalized Normal. The value of the variance, Var(TPC), is also evaluated and we 
provide a generalized form of the E(TPC) as far (i) the form of TPC and (ii) the 
probability density function.  
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1. Introduction  
        In the past, command and control regulations (like limiting the use of specific 
fuels or demanding certain pollution sources to use specific methods) dominated 
environmental policies with market based instruments (like taxes and tradable 
permits) to dominate over the last decades. Environmental taxation relies on Pigou’s 
concept of increasing polluters’ private costs to a level that includes the associated 
true social costs imposed to the society by their activities and the resulting related 
environmental damages.  
        Economic theory indicates that the optimal tax rate is determined where 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) equals to marginal damage cost (MD) of pollution to 
be abated. In a first best policy taxes should be differentiated between pollution 
sources according to the size of their resulting damage costs. A second best policy 
relies on the imposition of a high uniform tax rate. Halkos (1993) showed that moving 
from the first best optimum to a uniform tax rate does make a difference. Specifically 
and in the case of the acid rain problem in Europe it was shown that the costs of 
moving from the first-best to the imposition of a high uniform tax rate may not differ 
so much across countries but may be quite different within countries. 
 Pollution control and damage cost functions are non-linear and their exact 
shapes are usually unknown (Halkos and Kitsos, 2005; Halkos and Kitsou, 2014). At 
the same time, environmental effects are associated with significant irreversibilities 
interacting often in a very complex way with uncertainty. This complexity becomes 
even worse when taking into account the very long-run character of many 
environmental problems. Uncertainties in abatement and damage cost functions affect 
policy design in various ways. When marginal abatement costs are known and 
constant, the policy maker of the environmental issues (for instance the local 
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authorities) can minimize social cost by introducing a pollution tax that equalizes 
marginal abatement and damage costs.  
 But firms do not have always an incentive to reveal their true abatement 
costs.
1
 A weighted location adjusted differentiated taxation is introduced, based on the 
principle that when pollution is above “an optimal and accepted level” more taxation 
has to be imposed, while if it is below there is a chance of less taxation. In this way a 
new index to adjust taxation to the damage caused is proposed. 
In the absence of information about costs, the level of emissions taxes needed 
to achieve a target level of pollution abatement is unknown. This problem can be 
overcome by using an iterative procedure in which tax is adjusted. The tax that its tax 
system results in the social optimal pollution level is the differential tax. With 
differential taxation, the marginal emission tax paid by firm i is always equal to 
marginal damage costs and thereby minimizing social costs. The reason why this tax 
system results in the social optimal pollution level is that the firms -faced with a tax 
level that depends on emissions of firms- have an incentive to share information with 
respect to their abatement cost.  
The analysis becomes more complicated when the abatement costs are 
stochastic, i.e. developed around it a probabilistic randomness. In this case or when 
we have changes in the marginal abatement costs, specific environmental policies are 
required, because the results from the changes of the Pigouvian taxation may be 
                                                          
1
 Estimation of damage cost functions is much more complicated compared to abatement costs, as the 
influences of pollution cannot be identified with accuracy and there are many cases where it takes a 
long time to realize the effects of the damage imposed. To extract damage estimates in the case of 
acidification and the related transboundary pollution nature, a model taking account of the distribution of 
the externality among various countries (victims) is needed. As it is difficult to have a direct estimate the 
damage function its parameters may instead be inferred assuming countries equate national MD with 
national MAC and where restrictions on the derivatives of the damage cost function are significant. In 
this way the damage function may be “calibrated” assuming that national authorities act as Nash 
partners in a non-cooperative game with the rest of the world, taking as given deposits originating in 
the rest of the world (Hutton and Halkos, 1995; Halkos, 1996).   
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considered obsolete. Marginal abatement costs may change over time, by changing 
the innovative standards in the industry and by adopting the rapidly evolving new 
technologies. It is worth mentioning that adoption of new technologies reduces or 
aims to reduce emissions.  
Given innovation outcome (X), the Total Pollution Cost (TPC) is defined by 
the sum of the marginal abatement (MAC) and the marginal damage (MD) costs. That 
is the random variable TPC includes the social costs associated with pollution. In this 
paper we evaluate the expected value of TPC and introduce the estimation of its 
variance. Specifically, choosing as TPC the general form TPC= (κX+λ)
2
 (with κ, λ 
constants and X the introduced technology) coming from the γ-order generalized 
normal distribution
2
 we provide a generalization of the E(TPC) both in the form of 
TPC and the probability density function. The introduced technology represented by X is 
related with the distribution described by a shape parameter, a location parameter (the 
center of the pollution) and a scale parameter (the variance of pollution concentration 
around the center of pollution). In this way we propose a weighted location 
differentiated taxation to existing tax systems and a corresponding ratio to provide us 
with an index adjusting taxation to the damage imposed. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relative existing 
literature while section 3 explains and defines the proposed weighted location 
adjusted differential taxation. Section 4 discusses the use of the appropriate 
distribution and the evaluation of the expected value and the variance of the total 
pollution social cost. The last section concludes the paper and refers to the associated 
policy implications of the proposed tax differentiation. 
                                                          
2
 For more information on the γ-order generalized normal distribution see Appendix 1 and Kitsos and 
Tavoularis (2009), Kitsos and Toulias (2010) and Kitsos et al. (2012).  
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2.  A brief review of existing relative literature 
        As mentioned, economic efficiency demands that the marginal cost of 
emissions reduction equals to the marginal damage costs imposed. It is obvious that 
the problem of relating taxation and pollution has been considered by many 
researchers. The target is an equitable sharing of charges on polluters. Such a model 
could be used for example in harbors with heavy traffic, where the entrance or exit of 
ships pollutes the environment corresponding to the quality of the vessel. Therefore, 
the technology used, will be associated with the taxation system.  A new tax, which 
depends on innovation and at the same time, is above the expectations of a Pigouvian 
analysis was proposed by Requate (2004). The proposal of Requate under stochastic 
innovation has the same importance as the analysis of the other environmental 
measures.  
            As the distance and the location of GHG emissions’ sources are not related to 
the location of the environmental damages and degradation, they are considered as 
uniformly mixing pollutants
3
 with their concentration levels to be invariant from place 
to place. In the case of uniformly mixing pollutants the pollution levels depend on 
their total emissions levels. Similarly, in the case of non-uniformly mixing pollutants 
locations of their emission sources are significant in determining the spatial 
distribution of ambient levels of pollution (Perman et al., 2003).  
        In the case of non-uniformly mixed damage efficiency demands that the 
marginal costs of emissions control should be different across pollution sources and 
should be determined by the damage caused (Tietenberg, 2006). This may be 
accomplished by taking into consideration the associated marginal damages imposed 
                                                          
3
  Uniformly mixing pollutants take place when physical processes function to disperse them to the 
point where their spatial distribution is uniform (Perman et al. 2003, p. 178).  
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across sources. Coping with this issue we extend the existing results and propositions 
and introduce the weighted location adjusted tax. 
        In cases of existing regulations implementations are performed as spatially 
uniform with undifferentiated policies and with emissions being penalized at the same 
tax rate and permit prices (Fowlie and Muller, 2013). Theoretically, market based 
policies may tackle non-uniformly mixed pollutants (like NOX, SO2) with the optimal 
tax to be calculated by the marginal damage imposed. Taxes are different by pollution 
source for different levels of damage imposed. Differentiation will be profitable 
depending on the variation in damages caused across sources as well as the slopes of 
MACs (Mendelsohm, 1986; Halkos, 1993, 1994; Fowlie and Muller, 2013).  
In general, almost all tax systems involve differentiated tax rates among the 
various sectors (industry, commerce, households etc). In the case of uniform taxation 
the same marginal abatement costs are assumed with the economy in total to use the 
cheapest pollutant control methods in each sector. Reducing the tax rate in a sector 
may impose increases in the taxes imposed in the other sectors to attain the imposed 
environmental target. This implies that any deviation from uniform taxation may 
impose excess costs. Thus differentiated taxation among different sectors of an 
economy is optimal due to, among others, initial tax distortions, distributional 
concerns, trade terms and leakage motives (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2002).  
That is why we adopt the generalized γ-order Normal distribution for the 
analysis bellow. This distribution is based on an extra, shape parameter γ, which 
under different values of γ coincides with a number of well known distributions. 
Among them, and as it will be shown in the next section, with γ=1 is the Uniform 
distribution, with γ=2 is the well known Normal distribution and with γ=infinity, 
practically very large (or very small) coincides with the Laplace distribution. 
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Pre-existing tax distortions influence the efficiency effects of newly imposed 
environmental taxes. Among others, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Bovenberg 
and Goulder (1996) and Goulder et al. (1997) propose that tax interaction leads to 
higher efficiency costs (net of environmental benefits) of environmental taxation 
compared to a first-best case leading to optimal second-best environmental tax rates 
lower than the Pigouvian rate. At the same time, revenues raised by the imposition of 
environmental taxes may be used to reduce the distortions of the existing taxes 
(Terkla 1984; Oates 1995) offsetting in this way part of potentially negative tax 
interaction effects (Goulder 1995). 
 
3.  The weighed location adjusted differential tax 
The way we move on is by defining the “weighted location differential tax”. 
Theoretically this tax will be non-linear (since high pollutants should face appropriate 
taxes i.e. exponential greater and not linear) and non–time consistent (as pollution is 
not time constant depending for instance on weather conditions, amount of 
production, etc). This new indicator for environmental policy is based on a 
generalization of the differential taxation (Halkos, 1993, 1994; Kim and Chang, 1993; 
Mc Kitrick, 1999) and provides another look of differentiation in taxation, based on 
the location and the assumed distribution the new introduced technologies follow (see 
the definition of TPC above).  
  Our argument is that around the pollution center (source of pollution) the 
pollution is distributed according to a (possible) statistical model, related with the 
actual situation. In such a case it may be uniformly distributed i.e. in a distance, left or 
right from the pollution center the pollution to remain constant. That might be a 
helpful, mathematically, assumption, but it is difficult to be true. Another approach is 
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to consider a normally distributed pollution, with the mean being at the pollution 
center, so plus or minus it one standard deviation concentrates approximately the 0.68 
of the pollution. In cases of 0.99 levels of pollution concentration we may consider a 
±3σ confidence interval (or L=6σ) as essential. This is near to be true, as the tails 
contain a very small probability level to allow a pollution influence.  
Similarly, the Laplace distribution offers a solution to provide a “strong” 
pollution center and fat tails. All these three distributions are special cases of the γ-
order Generalized Normal distribution
4
. In this particular distribution, the third 
involved parameter, the shape one, called γ, taking all real values, but not within [0, 
1], offers a number of different distributions with fat tails mainly. With the value of 
γ=1, it is reduced to Uniform; with the value γ=2 is reduced to Normal; with the value 
of γ “infinity” practically very large is Laplace. In Proposition 1, in section 4, we 
obtain the appropriate evaluations for the total pollution (social) cost (TPC). 
Now, having the expected value and the variance of the total pollution cost, 
E(TPC) and Var(TPC), approximate 95% confidence intervals (CI) can be obtained – 
which are precise only in the Normal case of the form                
 CI(TPC) = ( E(TPC) -2 (Var(TPC))
0.5
 , E(TPC) + 2(Var(TPC)
0.5
 )  (1) 
The length of this .95 confidence interval is L=4[Var(TPC)]
0.5
. Similarly and in the 
case of a 99% CI, as mentioned, we work with the “distance” D of the end points of 
±3σ (or 6σ) CI with D=6[Var(TPC)]0.5 a kind of Quality Control criterion of the 
pollution. That is how far from the center of the pollution the area is contaminated 
with a 99% probability.  
                                                          
4
 See Appendix 1 and Kitsos and Tavoularis (2009), Kitsos and Toulias (2010) and Kitsos et al. (2012). 
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When pollution is at the optimal level the optimal length as above is L
* 
or D
*
. 
Therefore the ratio 
                           
*
( )
L
Tax
L
∆ =  or  
*
( )
D
Tax
D
∆ =     (2) 
is essential and can be a fair index to provide a weighted location differentiated 
taxation, as the case ∆(Tax)>1 is expected to be faced in existing tax system. The tax 
burden will be determined using expression (2) which depends on the optimal level of 
pollution L
*
 or D
* 
based on the choice of the appropriate new technology X and the 
corresponding TPC. More simply, with L
*
 and D
*
 we denote the optimal cases where 
the variance of TPC that is the variability of pollution is as expected and as a 
consequence the confidence limits are also expected. L and D may be the real length 
of the confidence intervals for 95% and 99% respectively. That is the corresponding 
ratio as in (2) provides researchers with an index adjusting taxation to contamination 
caused. If the evaluated in each case L and D are less that the optimal then the tax 
burden will be less. In such a way a source of pollution (industry, firm, etc) has an 
incentive to look for more efficient control methods.  
This idea can be also adopted when the pollution centre (that is the pollution 
source point) might be moving, as an aeroplane or a boat. In such a case around the 
pollution centre a “sphere” of pollution is created of the form 
                          (x-a)
2
 + (y- b)
2
 + (z-c)
2
 = R
2  
  (3) 
With R being the radius of the sphere and K(a,b,c) the pollution centre. If R>R
*
, with 
R
*
 being the optimal pollution level radius, a weighted location differentiated taxation 
is needed, in the sense that a radius of pollution R is accepted, based on the adopted 
technologies, but beyond that, there is a problem. In section 4 we proceed with the 
evaluation of the expected value and the variance of the total pollution cost. 
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4.  Adopting the appropriate distribution 
The easiest way, as far as the mathematical calculations are concerned, despite 
its unrealistic character, is to assume that the stochastic variable X –as a result of the 
R&D procedure, is uniformly distributed in the interval
1 1
,
2 2
δ δ − +  
, say, recalling 
the definition of the Uniform distribution. This means that in this research we suppose 
eventually the variable TPC is derived from the Uniform distribution, i.e. 
1 1
( , )
2 2
u δ δ− +  implying a uniform density function for X of the form  
 
1
( )
2
f X
δ
=   for 
1 1
,
2 2
X δ δ ∈ − +  
    (4) 
From the definition of the expected value the pollution related t- social cost for the 
linear tax, 
lt
TPC Ε   , is equal to 
1
2
1
2
( )TPC f x dx
δ
δ
+
−
∫ . Any general form of TPC=(κX+λ)2 
is presenting the appropriate area for TPC. 
  
 
An extension of the calculation of expected value is needed as it can be either 
normal with the known tails or a “sharp” one around ‘center’ with ‘heavy tails’, a 
Laplace distribution among others. Therefore the γ-order generalized Normal 
distribution was adopted
5
 as the extension of the Uniform distribution. The expected 
value of TPC can be evaluated and it can be seen that that the distribution is not only 
the Uniform but the 2( , )γ µ σΝ .
6
 Figure 1 clarifies the generalization and represents 
the relation between Uniform, Normal and Laplace. This distribution regards a 
number of other distributions which are with ‘fat tails’
7
 and can be used in various 
                                                          
5
 See Kitsos and Tavoularis (2009), Kitsos et al. (2012), Halkos and Kitsou (2014).  
6
 See appendix 1. 
7
 This is why we are referring to “a family of distributions”. 
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economic analyses like for instance in stock markets. So, the following results are 
proposed for the form (κg+λ)
2 
and ( ; , )f xγ µ Σ  letting X represent a random variable 
describing innovation. 
Figure 1: Graphical presentation of the relationship between  
Uniform, Normal and Laplace  
                         
 Proposition 1: If 2( , )γ µ σΧ Ν∼ it holds that:  
.  
2( )κ λ Ε Χ +  =
1
2 2 2
1
(3 )
( ) ( ) ( 2 )
11
( )
γ
γ
γ
γ γ κδ κµ κµ λ λ
γγ
γ
−
−
Γ
+ + +
−− Γ
  (5)  
2(( ))Var κ λΧ+ =
1
2
4 4 3
2
1 1
(5 ) (3 )
( ) ( ) 4 ( ) ( 4 )
1 11
( ) ( )
γ
γ
γ γ
γ γ γκδ κµ κµ λ
γ γγ
γ γ
−
− − Γ Γ 
− − + 
− −−  Γ Γ
  
 
                       2 2 2
1
(3 )
2 1
2( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
11
( )
γ
γ γ γκδ λ κµ κλµ
γγ γ
γ
−
Γ
−
 + − −  −− Γ
         (6) 
Proof in Appendix 2. 
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With different values of κ and λ a number of calculations for the 
corresponding TPC can be obtained. Next we present a number of examples.  
Example 1:  Let us assume that TPC = 2(1/ 4 3 / 8 )X− . Then it holds:  
 
1 1
2
14ˆ
1
1;
E[T ] 9( )
(3 )
( )
t
PC
γ γ
γγ γ
γγ γ
γ
δ
− −
− −
Γ
Γ
= +
ℓ
      (7) 
( )
1 121 1 1
4 2
2
ˆ 1 1; 21 1
4 271
4 1 4
(5 ) (3 ) (3 )
(6 ) 4 13
( ) ( ) ( )
Var ( ) 954 ( )
t
TPC
γ γγ γ γ
γ γ γγ γγ γ
γ γγ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
δ δ
− −− − −
− −− − −
 Γ Γ Γ
− + + 
Γ Γ Γ  
=
ℓ
           (8) 
 
Example 2:  Based on Example 1, for this particular TPC, it holds that the expected 
value and variance of TPC can be evaluated for the Uniform, Normal and Laplace 
distributions as:  
                  
;
1
4
1
4
ˆ
1
4
,3
E[T ] 9
18
, 1,
, , 2,
, , ,
t
Uniform
Normal
Laplace
PC γ
δ γ
δ γ
δ γ
=
=
= ±
+
+
 ∞

= 
+
ℓ
    (9) 
 
( )
211
45
27
4
27
4
2
7
4
;
2
ˆ
2
13 )318 (36
Var 954 (18
1908 2
, 1,
13 ) , 2,
13 ) ,(6 ,
t
Uniform
Normal
Laplac
TPC
e
γ
δ δ γ
δ δ γ
δ δ γ
− =
−
 +

= +

=
= ±∞+ +
ℓ
                (10) 
Example 3:  From (9) it obviously holds that the quantity ,
lt
TPC γ Ε    in the case of 
Uniform distribution is less than the corresponding Normal distribution, which is less 
that the corresponding Laplace distribution. That is:  
      1 ,2, ,l l lt t tTPC TPC TPC ±∞
     Ε < Ε < Ε        
For (10) and for 0 49.074δ< <  it holds that:8  
      ( ) ( ) ( )U N LVar TPC Var TPC Var TPC< <  
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   Figure 2 shows that with γ=1 (the case of uniform) the expected value is less 
than in the case of γ=2 (the case of normal) and flatter compared to the other two 
cases. Similarly the results for the comparison between γ=2 (Normal) and γ=±∞ (the 
case of Laplace) show that Laplace is sharper among them. This implies that changing 
D the expected value of TPC in the case of the uniform distribution is more stable 
compared to the other cases. With Laplace being the most sensitive in changing 
parameter δ, a small change in δ causes a sharp change in the expected value.    
 
Figure 2: Graphical presentations of ;E[TP ]tC γ =
ℓ
E 2(1/ 4 3 / 8 )X−  with 2(~ , )Xγ γ µ δN  
as function of the scale parameterδ , for different values of the parameter γ (blue is for 
1γ ≥  while red is for 0γ < ).   
 
5.  Discussion and policy implications 
  Environmental taxes should be targeted to the pollutants and should be related 
to the environmental damage caused. Without any government intervention countries 
(firms) will not take into consideration any environmental damage caused as this may 
be either spread across different regions or countries (as in the case of transfrontier 
pollution) or may be accumulated (stock pollution). For instance GHG emissions from 
14 
 
one location may play an important role in global climatic changes. The way to cope 
with the problem is to tax directly the environmental damage costs due to the damages 
imposed.    
Specifically, in this research we have considered a general distribution that the 
random variable X of the new technologies adopted by a firm, and therefore the total 
pollution cost (TPC) follows it covering 3 different lines of thought: a uniform 
approach of pollution around the center of pollution, adopting the new technologies; a 
normal that is most of the pollution around the centre; and a ‘sharp’ portion of 
pollution around the centre, i.e. the Laplace distribution.  
Due to this general distribution a weighted location differential tax was 
introduced. The proposed tax is differentiated according to the “level of distance” 
from the centre of pollution i.e. how far from it has the area being contaminated due 
to this particular source of pollution. As a conclusion it is very clear that we are 
depending on the assumption of the distribution for the (stochastic) TPC variable.  
In this paper as shown the application of the γ-ordered generalized Normal 
provides to the researcher the option to choose among three distributions: The 
Uniform, Normal and Laplace. That is among no-tails, normal tails, and fat tails. The 
decision is also based on the value of δ we choose at the first step – ‘how far’ from the 
‘origin of pollution’ we go.  
The question of what is the shape of the distribution to be followed is 
important. That is why the expected value of the total pollution cost, E(TPC), can be 
related to the appropriately calculated variance, Var(TPC), so that approximate .95 
confidence interval of the form ( ) 2 ( )TSC Var TPCΕ ±  to be evaluated, while for a 
.99 approximate confidence interval the factor 2 is replaced by 3. As the TPC includes 
the social cost related to pollution the greater expected value has to be associated with 
15 
 
higher taxation under the weighted location tax while the larger the variance the larger 
the area polluted and affected socially. Therefore the taxation system should take into 
consideration these issues.  
Due to difficulties in having available reliable direct cost estimates this 
approach may be used with various sensitivity scenarios and existing sensitivity maps 
of ecosystems applied to various indirect effects of depositions (see for instance 
Kämäri et al., 1992). It is feasible for every country to estimate the area in a number 
of sensitivity classes with values determined by ecological criteria like geology, 
vegetation, soil type, rainfall amounts etc. For instance acidic depositions vary 
significantly with time and location.  
If the relationship between source and receptor locations is not considered 
then the externality imposed will not be taken into examination. The externality is 
considered by the appropriate consideration of the transfer coefficients as provided by 
the co-operative programme for monitoring and evaluation of the long range 
transmission of air pollutants in Europe (European Monitoring and Evaluation 
Program, EMEP). Then mathematical models may be used by policy makers to define 
the optimal necessary emissions reductions for each pollution source (country) i and 
under the ecosystem sensitivity thresholds (see among others Halkos, 1994).  
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Appendix 1 
   The γ-ordered Normal Distribution 
We remind that the normal distribution 2( , )µ σΝ , with mean µ and 
variance 2σ , is defined as:  
               2
1 2
2
1 1
( ) exp ( )
2
(2 )
f x χ µ
σ
π σ
 = − − 

   (i) 
The multivariate generalization for a multivariate random variable with p-conditions, 
µ mean and matrix covariance Σ is compared with (i) resulting to:  
              1
1
2 2
1 1
( ) exp ( ) ( )
2
(2 )
p
ϕ χ χ µ χ µ
π
Τ − = − − Σ − 
Σ
   (ii) 
We denote this with ( , )pN µ Σ , Σ =det(Σ). 
A more general form of the multivariate distribution was investigated with an extra 
shape parameter. Indeed Kitsos and Tavoularis (2009) introduced through Logarithm 
Sobolev Inequalities (LSI) a new family of univariate γ-ordered Normal distribution 
the ( , )ργ µΝ Σ , which generalizes the Normal Distribution ( , )
ρ µΝ Σ , through an 
additional parameter [ ]0,1γ ∈ −ℝ . The new generalized Normal distribution 
commonly referred as γ-ordered Normal distribution.   
When ( )f x is the probability density function of a random variable 
( , )ργ µΧ Ν Σ∼  then, compared with (ii) above, ( )f x is defined as: 
  [ ]
1
2( 1)2
1
( ; ) det exp ( )pf x C Q x
γ
γ
γ γ
γ
µ
γ
−
−
 −
Σ = Σ − 

 with x ρ∈ℝ   (iii) 
Where 1( ) ( ) ( )Q x x xµ µ− Τ= − Σ − as in (ii) with the normality factor  
               
1
2
( 1)
12 ( )
1
( 1)
p
p p
p
C
p
γ
γ
γ
γ
π
γ γ
γ
−
−
Γ + −
=
−
Γ +
    (iv) 
Where if we set γ=2, i.e. 2 ( , )
ρ µΝ Σ  it follows that:  
2
2
( 1)
12 ( )
2
( 1)
2
p
p p
p
C
p
π
−
Γ +
=
Γ +
 = 2
2
1
(2 )
2
p
p
π
π
−
=     (v) 
Theorem 1: It holds that the multivariate γ-ordered Normal distribution ( , )ργ µΝ Σ for 
order values of γ=1,2±∞  coincides with  
( , )ργ µΝ Σ =
( )
( , )
( , )
( , )
D
U
L
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
µ
µ
µ
µ


Σ

Ν Σ
 Σ
       
0
1
2
γ
γ
γ
γ
=
=
=
= ±∞
1, 2p Dirac distribution
Uniform distibution
Normal distibution
Laplace distibution
=
 
Proof: In Kitsos et al. (2012, page 52). 
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     Appendix 2  
                   Proof of Proposition 1 
We have seen that:    
 ( )2 2 2 2 2 2 2E[( ) ] E[ ] 2 E[ ] Var( ) E [ ] 2 E[ ]X X X X X Xκ λ κ κλ λ κ κλ λ+ = + + = + + + ,   
Assuming 2~ , )(X γ µ δN  and using the variance of the γ -order Normal distribution, 
(see Kitsos and Toulias, 2010) we have that 
 ( )2 2 2 2E[( ) ] Var( ) 2X Xκ λ κ µ µκλ λ+ = + + + .  (7) 
For the variance of  2( )Y Xκ λ= +  we have  
2 2 2
4 3 2 3 4 2
4 2 2 2 3 4 2
4 2
4 3 2 2
2
Var( ) E[ ] E [ ] E[( ) ] E [( ) ]
E[ ] 4 λE[ ] 6( ) E[ ] 4 E[ ] E [( ) ]
Kurt( )Var ( ) 6( ) Var( ) 6( ) 4 E [( ) ]
Y Y Y X X
X X X X X
X X X X
κ λ κ λ
κ κ κλ κλ λ κ λ
κ κ µ µλ κλ κλ λ κ λ
= − = + − + =
= + + + + − + =
= + + + + − +
As 3E[ ] 0X =  ( 2 ),(γ µ δN  is symmetric distribution i.e. has zero obliquity), thus 
eventually, the above equation can be written sequentially as 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
4 2 2 2 3 4
2
2 2
4 2 2 2 3 4
2
2 2
3 2 2 2
2
4
3
4
4
Var( ) Kurt( )Var ( ) 6( ) Var( ) 6( ) 4
Var( ) 2
Kurt( )Var ( ) 6( ) Var( ) 6( ) 4
Var( ) 4(
4 Var( ) 2( ) Var( ) 4
Kurt( )Va
)
Y X X X
X
X X X
X
X X
X
κ κλ κλ κλ λ
κ κλ λ
κ κλ
µ µ
µ µ
µ µ
µ µ
µ µ
κλ κλ λ
κ κλ λ
κ λ κλ κλµ µ
κ
= + + + +
 − + + + = 
= + + + +
=
=
− + − −
− + − + −
2 2 2 3 4
4 2 4 4 2 2
3 3 2 3
4
2
r ( ) 6( ) Var( ) 6( ) 4
Var ( ) ( 2 Var( ) 4(
4( 4 Var( ) 2(
)
) Var( ) 2
)
( )) 4
X X
X X
X X
µ µ
µ µ µ
µ µ µ µ
κλ κλ κλ λ
κ κ κ κλ λ
κ λ κ λ κλ κλ κλ
+ + + +
− − − − −
− − − − −
 
And so 
4 2 2 4 2 3 3Var( ) [Kurt( ) 1]Var ( ) [4( ) 2 4 ]Var( ) ( ( 4 ))Y X X Xµ µ µκ κλ κ κ λ κ κµ λ= − + − − − +
 
Since 2~ , )(X γ µ δN , the above equation can be written finally in the form of (6) 
using the variance and the convexity of the γ-order Normal distribution (For more 
details, see Kitsos and Toulias, 2010). 
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Appendix 3   
    Checking the differences in variances 
Evaluating the differences between the variances of Uniform, Normal and Laplace 
distributions we may see which are positive or negative, so that to rearrange the order 
among them. 
 
(A) Between Uniform and Normal (take the difference from (10)) 
212.96 636 0
0
(12.96 636) 0 636
49.074
12.96
δ δ
δ
δ δ
δ
− = ⇔
=

− = ⇔ 
= =
 
0
0
U N
>
− = 
<
  
0, 49.074
0 49.074
δ δ
δ
< >
< <
 
The Normal distribution is greater than the Uniform distribution when (0, 49.074)δ ∈  
Otherwise, when 49.074δ > , the Uniform distribution of TPC is greater than its 
Normal distribution.  
( ) ( )
0 49.074
U NVar TPC Var TPC
δ
<
< <
 
(B) Between Laplace and Normal (take the difference from (10)) 
2954 396 0
0
(396 954) 0 954
2.40
396
δ δ
δ
δ δ
δ
− − =
=

+ = ⇔ 
= − = −
 
0
0
N L
<
− = 
>
( 2.40,0)
2.40
δ
δ
∈ −
< − or 0δ >
 
Because δ is taken always positive, we are interested in the case where δ>0, so the 
Normal distribution is grater that the Laplace distribution. 
( ) ( )N LVar TPC Var TPC<  
(C) Between Uniform and Laplace (take the difference from (10)) 
   
21590 383.04
0
(383.04 1590) 1590
4.15
383.04
δ δ
δ
δ δ
δ
− −
=

= − + ⇔ 
= − = −
 
0
0
U L
>
− = 
<
( 4.15,0)
4.15
δ
δ
∈ −
< − or 0δ >
 
So, for δ>0, the PSC Uniform distribution is less than the Laplace distribution. 
( ) ( )U LVar TPC Var TPC<  
From (A), (B) and (C) we have that for 0 49.074δ< <  holds:  
      ( ) ( ) ( )U N LVar TPC Var TPC Var TPC< <  
